In finance and economics, selectin outcome distribution. maximization strategies commonly proceed by zizjz-3. In contrast, marketing strategies attempt to lstnbutions in some optimal manner. A model is presented for such a strategy--maximizing the chances of achieving some uncertain action such as purchasing a particular product or voting for a particular candidate.
INTRODUCTION

Our stochastic model follows a tradition of similar deterministic economic models concerning advertising, goodwill and sales. See for example Nerlove and Arrow (1962), Dhrymes (1962), Thompson and Proctor (1969). Hochman and Hochman (1975).
However, in this paper we replace goodwill with attitude as the considered intervening variable linking promotion with sales. Goodwill sumnarizing the effect of current and post-advertising outlays on demand, has an economic dimension. In contrast the attitude construct providing an overall measure of affect toward the product--based on the perception of the product attributes and their importance is more naturally considered an intervening variable in marketing in particular and in social psychology in general.
There is, however, conflicting evidence concernina the usefulness of the attitude construct as a iredictor of behavior. Katona (1960 Katona ( , 1975 In this paper we take into account the effect of the contextual restrictions and the effect of other intervening socioeconomic variables by assumina an attitudinal threshold level. Once the consume& attitude level is higher than the threshold level he translates his attitude into behavioral action.
The probability of an action is thus assumed to depend on the threshold level (which can be segment specific) and on the attitude distribution. In this expository stage it is convenient to follow Thurstone (1927) and assume the attitude to be normally distributed. Affecting the mean and standard deviation of the attitude distribution the marketer changes the probability of passing the attitude/behavior threshold'level and thus the probability of action.
Due to space limitations we present here only one basic theorem concerning the marketer's optional strategy for the case of a Bernoulli sales function. and onlv a sketch of its oroof is orovided. Further details and extensive development of the subject are provided in Hibshoosh (1985). i) The optimal strategy for expected sales maximization will almost everywhere consist of a corner solution, i.e., manipulation of either u or o, but not a mixture of both.
MODEL AND ANALYSIS
To
ii) The optimal strategy: By passing rays from (a,O) through the end points of the budget segment and using arguments similar to case a, case b is established.
c. Case
Assume the end point (00. ut) to be located in the first quadrant.
In this case only a strategy of maximizinq u and minimizing o is considered.
The relevant budget P segment is positively sloped and valued f o (a0 > $&) then the marketer will bring his 0 u tobeo=O.
Using only part of the b$dget, he is able to bring his ES to 1. Of Of course, if he wishes he can utilize the result of the budget to further increase u. but that will not yield him higher expected sales.
INFERENCE OF REVEALED PROMOTIONAL STRATEGIES
the controversy the greater the number of voters who will switch to the challenqer's camo. However
The results obtained in Theorem 1 demonstrate often observed aspects of the promotional lifecycle. Consider an example taken from the political arena. Two candidates are running for political office. One of the candidates is a well-known incumbent while the other is an unknown challenger.
Initially the incumbent often has a tremendous advantage. His image (the population's average attitude toward him) is more favorable than that of his opponent. His personal qualities and positions are known to the public and he is often less controversial than the challenger. What is then the optimal strategy for the unknown challenger?
Initially, it is usually difficult to significantly increase his inferior public image. By arguments similar to case b; it is easily established that only strategies of attitudemean-maximization should be followed to achieve sales maximization.
Case
As in Case c, the relevant budget segment is positively sloped and parallels 11, but unlike Case c, it lies below the ray II'. We distinguish between two cases according to whether (p,,. on) is located in the first or there is a diminishing return of switched votes with increasing controversy.
In order to gain an election one must gain a majority vote. Therefore the challenger will stop emphasizing his controversial image and will focus instead on improving the public attitude toward him. In this state, higher gains in switched votes will result from image improvement (compared with increased controversy).
If attitude is normally distributed, once the expected attitude toward the challenger surpasses that of his opponent he will gain a majority vote.
If the candidate's next goal is to increase his majority margin, he will only be able to do so if he can win those voters repelled by his initial controversial appeal. This move is likely to annoy his most loyal backers, many of whom will be somewhat disappointed, but will vote for him anyhow. On the other hand, many of his previous Our results indicate that in many contexts of marketing the optimal strategy of the marketer would be to emphasize changing the central tendency of the attitude distribution or its spread but not both, and that in different stages in the diffusion cycle the marketer would have to switch strategies. We can also infer that on and off strategies based on gradual allocation of resources to promotional campaigns are inefficient, as they may lead to conflicting efforts (increasing and reducing the distribution spread) during the duration of the campaign.
